Armed On-board Protection of German Ships

(and by German Companies) by Salomon, T.R. (Tim)
Armed On-board Protection of German Ships
(and by German Companies)
Tim R. Salomon*
Abstract
Germany reacted to the rise of piracy around the Horn of
Africa not only by deploying its armed forces to the region,
but also by overhauling the legal regime concerning private
security providers. It introduced a dedicated licensing
scheme mandatory for German maritime security providers
and maritime security providers wishing to offer their serv-
ices on German-flagged vessels. This legal reform resulted in
a licensing system with detailed standards for the internal
organisation of a security company and the execution of
maritime security services. Content wise, the German law
borrows broadly from internationally accepted standards.
Despite deficits in state oversight and compliance control,
the licensing scheme sets a high standard e.g. by mandating
that a security team must consist of a minimum of four
security guards. The lacking success of the scheme sug-
gested by the low number of companies still holding a
license may be due to the fact that ship-owners have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to travel high-risk areas under the
German flag. Nevertheless, the German law is an example
of a national regulation that has had some impact on the
industry at large.
Keywords: German maritime security, private armed securi-
ty, privately contracted armed security personnel, anti-pira-
cy-measures, state oversight
1 Introduction
It is seemingly a long time ago that piracy has risen and
fallen around the Gulf of Aden. Discussing piracy today
feels almost like it used to be, that is, discussing a histor-
ical topic. This of course is in stark contrast to the lively
debate that took place five to ten years ago, when piracy
was a public topic of most paramount interest. How-
ever, the comparative silence that surrounds piracy
today is misleading to an extent. Piracy and maritime
violence in general are still very much alive. While there
has been a significant decrease of successful and attemp-
ted piratical attacks on trade vessels around the Horn of
Africa, the phenomenon has shifted regionally, and, as
* The author is a legal adviser to the German Federal Armed Forces (Bun-
deswehr) and currently seconded to the German Federal Constitutional
Court. The views and opinions expressed in this article and assumptions
made therein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of any agency of the German government.
The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their input.
long as there will be wealthy nations and flourishing
world trade, there will be maritime traffic and attempts
of criminal gangs to benefit from it.1
Looking back to the high time of Somali piracy, Germa-
ny has reacted primarily by deploying its armed forces
to the Horn of Africa as part of the EU Operation ATA-
LANTA.2 The Federal Republic of Germany is a nation
that has traditionally been very reluctant to deploy its
military. Its constitution entails a restrictive framework
reflecting the understanding that Germany, having
learned from its dark history, is a nation of peace.3 It is a
recent development that many Germans have come to
terms with the fact that preserving and living up to this
self-image in today’s world means to act when atrocities
happen and/or world peace is at peril. Accordingly, the
armed forces are no longer restricted to territorial
defence, but are increasingly understood as a means to
counter crises internationally.4 This started with
deployments in Cambodia and the Balkan region, both
in 1992.5 The fight against piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia has become a part of this development.
EU ATALANTA has had significant success. It met its
primary objective, the protection of the World Food
1. For the development of piracy see the popular accounts of D. Heller-
Roazen, The Enemy of All (2009) and A. Konstam, Piracy (2008); for
the rise of (relatively) more modern forms of piracy from 1500 to 1900
see M. Kempe, Fluch der Weltmeere (2010).
2. See the decision of the German government to participate in the EU-led
operation ATALANTA, Bundestagsdrucksache (BT-Drs.) 16/11337,
10 December 2008 on the basis of the Security Council resolution
regime starting with 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008 and the EU Joint
Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008.
3. For an account hereof in the English language see R.A. Miller, ‘Germa-
ny’s Basic Law and the Use of Force’, 17(2) Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 197, at 198 et seq. (Summer 2010).
4. See e.g. the speech of the Federal President, as he then was, Gauck on
31 January 2014 at the Munich Security Conference, accessible in Eng-
lish available at: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-
Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.pdf. In the recent past, the willingness to
deploy armed forces in ad hoc coalitions, e.g. to counter the threat
posed by the so-called Islamic State, evidences this tendency; see e.g.
Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundes-
wehr, at 81, 108 et seq., available at: https://www.bmvg.de/de/
themen/weissbuch; Federal Ministry of Defence, ‘Konzeption der Bun-
deswehr’, 20 July 2018, at 6 and 25 https://www.bmvg.de/de/
aktuelles/konzeption-der-bundeswehr-26384. Prior to this step, deploy-
ments were limited almost exclusively to NATO operations or opera-
tions based on Security Council resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII of
the UN Charter.
5. W. Link, Deutsche Außenpolitik (2006), at 197; H. Kundnani, German
Power: Das Paradox der deutschen Stärke (2016), at 75; M. Görte-
maker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2004), at 784.
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Programme deliveries to Somalia,6 without fail. How-
ever, the vast area of operation of Somali pirates who
had started using motherships in 2008-2009 to venture
further and further into the Indian Ocean7 made it
apparent that even the combined (military) engagement
of all nations willing to participate would fall signifi-
cantly short of being able to guarantee the security of all
trade vessels.
2 Development towards a
Legal Reform
This set the stage for ship owners becoming more vocal
about their situation and engaging with the public to
build up pressure on the political actors. In Germany,
they quickly and vehemently pushed for further state
action during the high time of piracy off the coast of
Somalia.8 Understandably so, after all their ships were
under attack and other countries provided ‘their vessels’
with further security measures, that is, by making the
armed forces available for private ships in the case of the
Netherlands9 or by opening ways to allow ship owners
to employ armed guards for their vessels as was the case,
for example, in Greece and Denmark.10 At this point of
time in Germany, politics and the shipping industry had
been at odds with each other for a while. Germany,
being the largest container ship-owning country, is
widely seen as a global maritime player.11 However,
while many shipping companies are seated in Germany,
German ship owners traditionally resort to flags of con-
venience.12 Consequently, the size of its flag has never
6. See the first indent of Art. 1(1) of the EU Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP
of 10 November 2008.
7. See e.g. A. Palmer, The New Pirates (2014), at 167 et seq.
8. See e.g. H. Friederichs, ‘Reeder fordern Ausweitung des Anti-Piraten-
Einsatzes’, Zeit Online, available at: https://www.zeit.de/online/
2009/18/piraten-tagung (last visited 22 June 2009).
9. See the contribution by Paul Mevis in this volume.
10. See the contribution of Christian Frier in this volume; for the whole
development, see also Y. Dutton, ‘Gunslingers on the High Seas: A Call
for Regulation’, in J. Basedow, U. Magnus & R. Wolfrum (eds.), The
Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2011-2013 (2014) 251, at 274
et seq.
11. See UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2018 (2018), 29 et seq.
12. See C. Koenig and D. König, in von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, Grundge-
setz, Art. 27, paras. 8, 12; for the long-standing practice of using flags
of convenience, see e.g. B.A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience (1962);
E. Osieke, ‘Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments’, 73(4)
AJIL 604-27 (1979); D. König, ‘Flags of Convenience’, in R. Wolfrum
(ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law online edi-
tion (2008). This practice is the (unintended) consequence of Art. 91(1)
sentence 2 UNCLOS mandating a genuine link between the flag state
and the ship flying its flag, but not defining the concept. It has since
been construed widely by the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea in its judgments SAIGA (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grena-
dines v. Guinea [Merits]), judgment of 1 June 1999, paras. 75et seq.,
83 and Grand Prince Case (Belize v. France [Prompt Release]), judg-
ment of 20 April 2001, paras. 82et seq.; Virginia G Case (Panama v.
Guinea-Bissau), judgment of 14 April 2014, paras. 108 et seq., 110,
113; Available at: https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases; see
C. Koenig and D. König, in von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, Grundgesetz,
Art. 27, para. 7.
really reflected Germany’s status as a major player in
the field. There have been political agreements between
the German government and the shipping industry, in
which the political players promised better (financial)
conditions in numerous ways for German companies, if
they agreed to increase the number of ships flying the
German flag.13 Yet, with the global economic crisis still
ongoing in 2010, ship owners were generally hesitant to
fulfil such commitments due to the higher costs associ-
ated with the German flag, and used piracy, especially
the perceived inaction of the German government, as an
explanation. They also used this argument as a lever to
push for further state action.14 At this point, many Ger-
man ship owners had already started employing armed
security personnel to protect their ships, which sailed
under flags such as Liberia,15 a flag renowned for being
very forthcoming with allowing armed personnel.
Against this backdrop, a public discussion ensued. The
main union of the Federal Police positioned the Federal
Police as a possible key actor touting their ability to train
vessel protection detachments (VPD) and offer police
protection to German-flagged vessels.16 The Federal
Police (former Bundesgrenzschutz, the German border
police) was still recovering from a loss in significance
after the German reunification and the creation of
Europe’s Schengen Area, which made new areas of
responsibilities attractive. Furthermore, it could legally
rely on § 6 Bundespolizeigesetz (Act on the Federal
Police), awarding the Federal Police broad jurisdiction
including antipiracy measures and arguably VPD serv-
ices.17 Such a step also would have added to the appeal
of the German flag. However, factually, the Federal
Police were lacking the equipment and trained person-
nel for such specific duties, and it soon became clear
that both deficiencies would not be remediable on short
notice.18 The German Armed Forces, which – in con-
trast to the Federal Police – already had the capability to
provide VPD services, were lacking personnel also, see-
ing that they calculated the number of soldiers needed
to protect one vessel as being between ten and twelve19 –
13. See e.g. O. Preuß and R. Zamponi, ‘Schwarz-Rot-Streit: Konflikt unter
deutschen Reedern’, Hamburger Abendblatt, 31 December 2010, avail-
able at: http://bit.ly/2DNVMEM.
14. See e.g. M. Lutz, ‘Reeder verlangen von Regierung mehr Schutz vor
Piraten’, WeltOnline, 11 August 2011, available at: https://bit.ly/
2Qfv9BC.
15. P. Hagen, ‘German Owners Flag Out to Carry Private Security Forces’,
Lloyd’s List, 15 June 2010.
16. See e.g. B. Witthaut, ‘Einsatz der Bundespolizei am Horn von Afrika’,
BehördenSpiegel, 8 February 2012, available at: http://bit.ly/2BISKDF;
M. Lutz, ‘Polizei fordert 500 Soldaten zur Piraten-Bekämpfung’, Welt,
10 August 2011, available at: http://bit.ly/2D9LeP8.
17. The norm states: ‘Without prejudice to the competence of other
authorities or of the armed forces, the Federal Police shall take the
measures outside the German territorial sea to which the Federal
Republic of Germany is entitled under international law. This does not
apply to measures assigned by federal law to other authorities or
departments or reserved exclusively for warships.’
18. See e.g. Walter, ‘Einsatz der BPol am Horn von Afrika derzeit nicht dar-
stellbar’, BehördenSpiegel, 16 February 2012, available at: http://bit.ly/
2oDjj84.
19. ‘Schutz durch Soldaten auf dem Prüfstand’, MaritimHeute.de,
17 December 2010 (article on file with the author); the Federal Police
234
ELR 2018 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000131
a number too large to present a realistic option for ship
owners. Consequently, the pressure was building on the
political actors. Would desperate Somalis with their
small skiffs and rusty (albeit dangerous) guns be enough
to result in an all-too-public display of the inability of
the German government to protect its trading fleet’s
vessels? In this situation, the political actors aligned
with the international tendency to support privately
contracted armed guards on commercial vessels.20 This
stance was prone to significant controversy in Germany.
There were well-founded worries that such a move
would escalate the phenomenon of piracy, since the
pirates had seldom used their guns on board the vessels,
knowing they would not meet armed resistance there.21
In the same vein, members of the ATALANTA opera-
tion warned that their work would become more com-
plicated, if armed guards of varying qualities would be
inserted into the equation, for example, in hostage situa-
tions.22 Furthermore, the image of private armed guards
on trade vessels in shooting battles with pirates while
the crew and possibly passengers or potentially hazard-
ous cargo were on board was unattractive to say the
least.
The nevertheless swift passing of the legal reform had
different reasons. First, there was the already described
lack of alternatives. The government was cornered by
the calls for action from the maritime industry, which
were amplified by the publics’ concern over shocking
displays of destruction on the hijacked vessels and the
trauma caused to mariners who fell victim to pirate
attacks.23 While the opponents of such a legislative
reform could find numerous arguments against allowing
private armed guards, it was hard (and still is) to rally
behind a position which provides no viable alternative to
protect German trade vessels from pirate attacks. How-
ever, the real driver for reaching a swift political agree-
ment on such a controversial topic was that there was
general agreement about the deficiency of the legal
framework as it was. Contrary to the public perception
and political statements,24 rather than outlawing private
also calculated ten to twelve police officers to counter pirate attacks
effectively, see Walter, above n. 18.
20. See T. Wiegold, ‘Immer mehr private Sicherheitsteams gegen Piraten’,
29 June 2011, available at: http://augengeradeaus.net/2011/06/imer-
mehr-private-sicherheitsteams-gegen-piraten; for the international ten-
dency, see Dutton, above n. 10, at 274 et seq.; see also the representa-
tion of IMO’s evolving position on the issue, available at: http://
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/
Private-Armed-Security.aspx.
21. See D. König and T.R. Salomon, ‘Private Sicherheitsdienste im Einsatz
gegen Piraten’, Rechtswissenschaft (RW) 303, at 331 (2011).
22. D. Osler, ‘EU NAVFOR Warns Private Security Will Complicate Rescue
Operations’, Lloyd’s List, 15 September 2010.
23. See the case of the Beluga Nomination, ‘Die Piraten haben den Boot-
smann erschossen’, FAZ, 1 February 2011, available at: http://
www.faz.net/-gqi-daq.
24. The former maritime coordinator of the German government famously
stated that the traffic lights would be changed from red to yellow on
the issue of maritime security providers, T. Wiegold, ‘Private gegen
Piraten: “Wir stellen die Ampel von Rot auf Gelb”’, augengera-
deaus.net, 20 July 2011, available at: http://augengeradeaus.net/
2011/07/private-gegen-piraten-wir-stellen-die-ampel-von-rot-auf-
gelb.
armed guards on trade vessels, the legal framework as it
stood actually permitted their use without providing
adequate measures of quality control.25
3 Legal Framework before
2013
While the phenomenon of armed security personnel on
trade vessels was new, the existing national legislation
on security guards, especially § 34a of the Trade Regula-
tion Act (Gewerbeordnung, in the following: GewO)
and § 28 Weapons Act (Waffengesetz, in the following:
WaffG), applied to private armed guards on vessels fly-
ing the German flag. The flag state principle means that
the jurisdiction of the flag state applies to a ship flying
its flag. Furthermore, the aforementioned norms were
not limited to the German territory.26 The following
segment focusses on the law as it was until 2013, in
order to allow a side-by-side view of the law before and
after the legislative overhaul to illustrate the far-reach-
ing effects of the reform.
3.1 Starting and Running a Security Company
Pursuant to § 34a GewO
3.1.1 Basic Requirements to Start and Run a Security
Company
Pursuant to § 34a(1), sentence 1, GewO, the commercial
provision of protection for the life and property of peo-
ple or businesses was subject to government authorisa-
tion.27 § 34a GewO in principle awarded the competent
German authorities discretion (Ermessen) to authorise
the owner of a company offering protection services.
However, if the authorities had grounds to assume that
the person seeking such authorisation was ‘unreliable’,
lacked the means and securities needed or could not
produce a certificate, attesting that he or she has been
instructed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
they were bound by law to deny their authorisation as
provided by § 34a(1), sentence 3, GewO. Furthermore,
25. See R. Brinktrine, ‘Der Einsatz privater Sicherheitsdienste zum Schutz
vor Piraterie und maritimen Terrorismus’, in Stober (ed.), Der Schutz vor
Piraterie und maritimem Terrorismus zwischen internationaler,
nationaler und unternehmerischer Verantwortung (2010) 39, at 47 et
seq.; König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at 319 et seq.; T.R. Salo-
mon and S. tho Pesch, ‘Das Zulassungsregime für bewaffnete Sicher-
heitsdienste auf Handelsschiffen’, DÖV 760, at 762 (2013);
C. Oehmke, Der Einsatz privater Sicherheitsdienste auf Handelsschiffen
zur Abwehr gegen Piraterie (2017), at 441; Working Group of the Con-
ference of the Ministers of the Interior, Bekämpfung der Seepiraterie,
29 November 2011, at 27, available at: https://www.innenminister
konferenz.de/IMK/DE/termine/to-beschluesse/11-12-09/
Anlage14.pdf.
26. With further references König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at
319; see also Oehmke, above n. 25, at 441.
27. In this segment, the past tense will be used, as the law as it stood
before 2013 is assessed. While many of those rules are still in force and
still regulate the private security sector in Germany, after the newly
introduced rules discussed as follows, they no longer apply to private
maritime security, as the new rules are lex specialis, see Oehmke,
above n. 25, at 443.
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if the requirements were fulfilled, that is, there were no
grounds for refusal, the competent authorities were
under a duty to grant the authorisation following from
constitutional law’s influences on § 34a GewO protect-
ing everyone’s occupational freedom and the freedom of
commerce.28
A company owner authorised to offer protection serv-
ices pursuant to § 34a(1) GewO in turn was only allowed
to employ people who were ‘reliable’ and could produce
a certificate, attesting that they had been instructed by
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry concerning
their rights and obligations. Slightly higher require-
ments were in place for private security guards working
in public areas, protecting retail shops against shoplift-
ers and working as doormen in nightclubs. Those had to
pass an exam pursuant to § 34a(1), sentence 5, GewO,
evidencing that they had sufficient knowledge of their
rights and obligations under the law.29
In summary, apart from possibly having to pass a gener-
al knowledge examination, persons needed to fulfil three
requirements to start and run a security company offer-
ing protection services. They had to be reliable, have the
necessary means and securities (to get through the first
six months30), be able to produce a certificate that they
received instructions on their rights and duties and basic
training concerning de-escalation and so on. Of course,
reliability is a vague legal term, but it is regularly used
for the regulation of all kinds of industries in the GewO,
is sufficiently open to interpretation to allow it to be
applied differently in different industries and has been
given contours by the courts. In summary, persons are
unreliable, when there are grounds to suspect that they
are incapable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations and
execute their work in a proper form.31 For the security
industry, this has been held to be the case, for example,
if a person running a security company has a criminal
record, especially entailing convictions for assault or
economic crimes.32 To ascertain this, the authorities
may access the criminal records of a person.33
28. With further references König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at
320; U. Schönleitner, ‘Erlaubnisbedürftiges Bewachungsgewerbe’, in
R. Stober and H. Olschok (eds.), Handbuch des Sicherheitsgewerber-
echts (2004) 191, at 194.
29. For a general overview, König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at 319
et seq.; D. König and T. R. Salomon, ‘Fighting Piracy – The German Per-
spective’, in P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (eds.), The Law and Practice
of Piracy at Sea (2014) 225, at 240 et seq.; for a closer focus on the
statutory exam, F. Jungk and C. Deutschland, in J.C. Pielow (ed.), Beck-
OK GewO (2017), § 34a, para. 34 et seq. The content of the exam is
regulated by Annex 4 to the Ordinance on the Guard Profession (Ver-
ordnung über das Bewachungsgewerbe), as published on 10 July 2003
(Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette, in the following: BGBl.]
I 1378), last amended by Art. 1 of the ordinance of 1 December 2016
(BGBl. I 2692).
30. See F. Jungk and C. Deutschland, in J.C. Pielow (ed.), Beck-OK-GewO
(2010), § 34a, para. 33.
31. P. Marcks, in Landmann/Rohmer (ed.), Gewerbeordnung (2009), § 34a
GewO, para. 29; Jungk and Deutschland (2017), above n. 29, para. 30.
32. Jungk and Deutschland (2017), above n. 29, para. 32.
33. This is today regulated in § 34a(1) sentence 5 GewO; § 34a(1) sentence
6 GewO also allows an information request to the local Office for the
Protection of the Constitution, see Jungk and Deutschland (2017),
above n. 29, para. 32.
3.1.2 Further Aspects of § 34a GewO
§ 34a GewO also authorised the Federal Ministry for
Economic Affairs and Energy to issue ordinances,34
which was used in December 1995.35 This ordinance
detailed, among other matters, mandatory insurance
policies for security companies, the necessity of carrying
special identification and the modalities of the instruc-
tion by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry pur-
suant to § 34a(1), sentence 3, GewO as well as the
examination needed pursuant to § 34a(1), sentence 5,
GewO, especially the number of hours this instruction
takes and the subject matter it covers.36
§ 34a(4) GewO authorised the authorities to mandate a
company to discontinue an employee because facts sug-
gest that he or she is unreliable, that is, because of a
recent criminal conviction.37 § 34a(5) GewO explained
in how far private security companies were allowed to
use force. It outlined that private security providers may
only exercise the rights enjoyed by all citizens, especially
the right to self-defence, unless public powers have been
conferred upon them, which was rarely the case. This
was a general feature of the discussion leading up to the
new regulation on maritime security providers. It is gen-
erally accepted on a constitutional law level that the
state has the monopoly to use force.38 Thus, the ques-
tion arose whether the use of privately contracted secur-
ity providers would contradict or infringe upon this
monopoly. In Germany, there is widespread agreement
that this was not the case, since such guards do not exer-
cise public powers or have public authority.39 Employ-
ing armed guards on board ships – from a legal stand-
point – is no different from employing armed guards to
protect a money transport to and from a bank in Germa-
ny.40 However, in the case of private armed guards pro-
tecting vessels there may be additional legal duties of the
German state to regulate this industry.41
3.1.3 State Oversight and Sanctions
Security companies fell under the same regime of indus-
trial inspection as other trades. Pursuant to this control
regime, authorities could step in if a business was run
without authorisation and mandate the closure of the
business.42 If a business was run with an authorisation
but the prerequisites for the authorisation were no lon-
ger met, that is, the business owner became unreliable,
34. § 34a(2) GewO.
35. See above n. 29; see also Marcks, above n. 31, para. 35.
36. Jungk and Deutschland (2017), above n. 29, para. 64.
37. See Jungk and Deutschland (2017), above n. 29, para. 71. This may
also result in the revocation of an authorisation vis-à-vis the employer,
since a misconduct of an employee may be attributable to the employer
or reflect the employer’s unreliability, see Marcks, above n. 31, at 40.
38. König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at 322 et seq.; Oehmke,
above n. 25, at 386 et seq., both with further references.
39. See Working Group of the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior,
above n. 25, at 27.
40. König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at 322 et seq.; see also
J. Ennuschat, ‘Der neue § 31 GewO – ein Schritt zur Privatisierung der
öffentlichen Sicherheit?’ Gewerbearchiv 329, at 331 (2014).
41. For a discussion, see Oehmke, above n. 25, at 412 et seq. and 435 et
seq.
42. § 15(2) GewO. G. Sydow, in J.C. Pielow (ed.), Beck-OK-GewO (2010),
§ 15, para. 31.
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the authorisation could be withdrawn43 and the business
closure mandated.44
For the purposes of effective state oversight, the compe-
tent authorities could mandate the business owner to
disclose information on certain aspects.45 Such a request
could only be denied if a business owner would other-
wise expose himself or herself or his or her own relatives
to the danger of criminal prosecution.46 Moreover,
authorities had the right to enter the premises of busi-
nesses during business hours to inspect the business
records.47
The GewO also contained norms on sanctions, for
example, if a business owner runs a security company
without authorisation. Such behaviour was – and still is
– an administrative offence which may result in a fine of
up to 5,000 euros.48 The repetition of such behaviour
may amount to a criminal offence pursuant to § 148
no. 1 GewO punishable with a fine or imprisonment of
up to one year.
3.2 The Prerequisites for the Provision of Armed
Security Pursuant to § 28 WaffG
Anyone who protected goods or people using weapons
not only needed the authorisation pursuant to the
GewO but also had to comply with the Weapons Act.
The material prerequisites of the Weapons Act were a
bit stricter in comparison to the relatively lax § 34a
GewO, since armed protection results in a higher risk. A
person seeking authorisation to protect people in an
armed fashion first had to be reliable pursuant to § 5
Weapons Act. This notion of reliability was a bit stricter
or at least more detailed compared to that in § 34a
GewO, because in contrast to the GewO, § 5 WaffG
outlined in some detail what it meant by reliability and
did not leave it up to the executive and judicative
branch to decide. For example, a person was deemed to
be unreliable in the sense of the norm, if facts justified
the assumption that he or she would handle weapons or
ammunition carelessly.49
Other than having to prove reliability, a person wanting
to offer armed protection also had to show the personal
aptitude for the task, which is deemed to be lacking, for
example, if facts justify the assumption that he or she is
addicted to alcohol or other controlled substances.50
Furthermore, the person had to evidence their expertise
with weapons.51 The details of how to prove expertise
and which standards applied were outlined in secondary
43. Pursuant to the general rules, e.g. § 49 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
(VwVfG, Administrative Procedure Act) (or § 48 VwVfG, if the prereq-
uisites of an authorisation pursuant to § 34a GewO were never met,
but the authorisation was nevertheless granted); see B. Handan,
‘Grundzüge des Gewerberechts’, JA 249, at 253 (2007).
44. § 15(2) GewO.
45. § 29(1) GewO.
46. § 29(3) GewO.
47. § 29(2) GewO.
48. § 144(1) no. 1(f); (4) GewO.
49. § 5(1) no. 2(a) WaffG.
50. § 6(1) sentence 1, no. 2 WaffG.
51. § 7 WaffG.
legislation.52 Usually, the participation in detailed cour-
ses and examinations were required. The WaffG also
included an age restriction, resulting in a minimum age
limit of eighteen years pursuant to § 2(1) WaffG.
Other than reliability, personal aptitude and expertise, a
person furthermore had to evidence a need or necessity
to use weapons pursuant to § 8 WaffG. § 28 WaffG,
which regulated the specific case of security guards,
obliged security guards to demonstrate that the specific
service they intended to offer required the use of arms,
due to the circumstances of the single case, namely, the
nature of the person or object under protection.53
The Weapons Act also restricted the kinds of weapons
allowable under the law,54 for example, by disallowing
weapons of war, especially automatic weapons. The
German Federal Criminal Police Office had jurisdiction
to decide in cases of doubt whether a weapon was allow-
able or not.55
If all prerequisites were fulfilled, a person was able to
apply for permission to purchase and own a specific
weapon.56 However, carrying a weapon necessitated a
separate permission57 and yet another permission was
needed to actually fire a weapon.58
3.3 Interim Conclusion
In conclusion, 34a GewO and § 28 WaffG did not dis-
tinguish between privately contracted armed guards
protecting trade vessels in high-risk areas and store
detectives or nightclub bouncers. The rules applied to
all kinds of armed guarding activities and did not fall
short of applying to private maritime guards.59 This led
to problematic results. On the one hand, the material
standards ensuring that people offering armed protec-
tion to trade vessels were highly trained and skilled was
lacking.60 On the other hand, the old law would have
proven to be factually prohibitive. Mandating that mari-
time armed guards show up in person before a German
Chamber of Commerce and Industry to be instructed in
German on their rights and obligations under German
law among other matters would have been impractical.
The same applies for the need to obtain the necessary
52. General Order to the Weapons Act (Allgemeine Waffengesetz-Verord-
nung) of 27 October 2003 (BGBl. I 2123), last amended by Art. 2 of the
Law of 30 June 2017 (BGBl. I 2133).
53. König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, at 325, with further referen-
ces.
54. § 2(2) WaffG; Annex 2 to the WaffG.
55. §§ 2(5), 48(3) WaffG.
56. § 10(1) WaffG.
57. § 10(4) WaffG; see A.V. König and C. Papsthart, in NomosKommentar
WaffG (2012), § 10, para. 11.
58. § 10(5) WaffG, which does not apply in cases of self-defence; see
König and Papsthart, above n. 57, para. 14. This requirement is still in
place today, resulting in a prohibition to train the shooting of weapons
at sea unless a permission pursuant to § 10(5) WaffG has been granted;
see the information provided by the BAFA in the FAQ section on their
webpage, ‘Is it permitted to organise the weapons training on the high
seas?’, available at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/Maritime_
Security/maritime_security_node.html (last visited 27 December 2017).
59. See the widely accepted definition of guard profession in Jungk and
Deutschland (2017), above n. 29, para. 4 et seq. including the exercise
of active personal care to intentionally protect a person or good against
external threats.
60. Oehmke, above n. 25, at 441.
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permission pursuant to the Weapons Act, again requir-
ing mandatory classes in German. Such a procedural
necessity would have proven at least extremely cumber-
some for companies from foreign countries, much more
so, if they in turn employed maritime guards who came
from yet different countries.
Overall, one would have to assess the legal regime estab-
lished by § 34a GewO and § 28 WaffG as fundamentally
unfit for the dangerous practice of protecting vessels
with armed guards against piratical attacks. ‘Reliability’
alone is insufficient as the main quality standard for
armed guards on trade vessels, and the GewO did not
provide for much more. In addition, the regulatory
system lacked a proper regime of state control and sanc-
tions in that it did not address the challenges of regulat-
ing an industry that operated far away from German
territory. Furthermore, it failed to provide the proce-
dural standards needed to regulate an international
industry made up mainly of companies from foreign
countries.
This regulatory framework left the government with
two options:
1. Leave the law as it is and allow armed guards on
board trade vessels without mandating meaningful
vetting and quality control, while factually discourag-
ing the practice by upholding the cumbersome
national authorisation process with its focus on
instructions and examinations in the German lan-
guage. This option would have most likely resulted in
numerous violations of the GewO and WaffG norms
by ship owners or – much more likely – a further
decrease in the number of vessels flying the German
flag.
2. Regulate privately contracted maritime security com-
panies and thus attempt to introduce a normative
framework tailor-made for the regulation of such a
dynamic and international trade.
It chose the second alternative.
4 Legal Reform of Maritime
Security Providers in German
Law
In doing so, German legislators had to deal with the ten-
sion that typically exists when regulating the maritime
industry. On the one hand, introducing high-quality
standards for armed guards operating on German ves-
sels could drive ship owners away from the German
flag, since rendering the German legislation inapplicable
requires no more than that – a change of flags. Thus,
any such regulation would have been a ‘paper tiger’, a
regulation of merely, if at all, theoretical value. Intro-
ducing low-quality standards, on the other hand, would
not have increased the security of trade vessels, but fac-
tually would have been to its detriment, for example, by
allowing ‘cowboys’61 with guns on board German-flag-
ged vessels. Moreover, such a move would have signifi-
cantly shifted the burden of quality control to the ship
owners. Without being able to rely on high-quality
standards set by the German government they would
have had to adopt their own vetting and quality assur-
ance mechanisms to make sure that they contract only
suitable and reliable security companies or otherwise
put their crews, vessels and cargo at risk and face possi-
ble damage claims.62
With the new legislation, Germany chose a middle path.
The Bundestag voted to amend the GewO and the
WaffG. However, it departed significantly from the tra-
ditional German way of regulating businesses. Even the
competent authorities, the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy and the Federal Ministry of
Transport and Digital Infrastructure acknowledged that
the new § 31 GewO, which was introduced in 2013,63
established factually and, legally speaking, a totally new
procedure for a trade license.64
Pursuant to the new system, maritime security provid-
ers need to obtain a license issued by the Federal Office
for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) in
consultation with the Federal Police.65 The key differ-
ence between the new licensing system and other sys-
tems of trade licenses in German law is the corporate
approach. In the past, the GewO always focussed on the
person, that is, the company owner and his or her
employees, with a view to ascertaining their reliability.
§ 31 GewO established a government approval system
that focusses on the company itself. Instead of the com-
pany owner and the employees having to prove their
reliability, the new regulatory system has the aim to
ascertain whether the company has put the necessary
organisational processes in place to safeguard that only
reliable and suitable employees will undertake vessel
protection services. To this end, the BAFA will, for
example, not mandate a certain kind of training for new
guards; it will simply look at the security and training
concept, which the company has to document and make
available during the licensing procedure, and evaluate
whether based on this procedure it is sufficiently safe-
guarded that only reliable, apt and competent people are
61. The term ‘cowboys’ is often used as a synonym for unreliable, possibly
trigger-happy, security guards not accustomed to the maritime environ-
ment; see e.g. Dutton, above n. 10, at 268; but the term also finds use
in the academic discussion on private military and security companies;
see K. Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New Wars (2010), at
13.
62. See Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 762; M. Mudric, ‘Armed
Guards on Vessels: Insurance and Liability’, 50 Comparative Maritime
Law 217-68 (2011), available at: http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/114368.
63. Gesetz zur Einführung eines Zulassungsverfahrens für Bewachungsun-
ternehmen auf Seeschiffen of 4 March 2013 (BGBl. I 362), last amen-
ded by the Law of 24 April 2013 (BGBl. I 930).
64. Erfahrungsbericht des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie
im Benehmen mit dem Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale
Infrastruktur und dem Bundesministerium des Innern, BT-Drs. 18/6443
of 16 October 2015, at 2.
65. § 31(1,2) GewO.
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going to be deployed to trade vessels.66 A slight depar-
ture from the corporate approach is made for the assess-
ment of the management. The reliability, personal apti-
tude and competence of the management have to be evi-
denced during the licensing procedure.67
Aside from the GewO, the Weapons Act also has been
amended to make a similar approach possible.
4.1 The Basic Requirements for Obtaining a
License
The new § 31 GewO mandates that security companies
planning to guard vessels sailing under German flag sea-
wards of the German Exclusive Economic Zone against
external threats68 need a license issued by the BAFA in
consultation with the Federal Police69 regardless of
where the security company is seated. Moreover, any
German security company wishing to provide such
services needs the same license regardless of the flags of
the vessels on which they operate.70 While § 34a GewO
remains in force, § 31 GewO today applies as lex spe-
cialis to security companies offering protection to trade
vessels in the sense described previously.71
4.1.1 The Requirements Pursuant to § 31 GewO for
Maritime Security Companies
§ 31 GewO lists specific requirements regarding the
internal organisation and procedures of the companies
applying for the license, and it also seeks to ensure tech-
nical and personal reliability, personal aptitude and
competence of the persons involved.72 However – in line
with the corporate approach – it is not the German
authorities that scrutinise the personal reliability of the
people involved, but the company itself, with the Ger-
man authorities merely assessing, if the internal organi-
sation of said company guarantees that their employees
meet the requirements. As such, the license is to be
refused, pursuant to § 31(2), sentence 3, no. 1 GewO,
when the company seeking to be licensed does not fulfil
the requirements concerning the operational organisa-
tion and internal procedures needed to ensure that the
people involved in the provision of security services are
reliable and demonstrate the necessary personal apti-
tude. Grounds for refusal pursuant to § 31(2), sentence
3, no. 2, GewO, are also given, if the management per-
sonnel does not demonstrate the necessary professional
and personal competence and reliability or if the compa-
ny fails to produce the required business liability insur-
ance.73 Other relevant requirements, which are much
66. König and Salomon (2014), above n. 29, at 242; Salomon and tho
Pesch, above n. 25, at 763; H. Jessen, ‘Der Einsatz privater bewaffneter
Sicherheitsunternehmen auf Handelsschiffen unter deutscher Flagge’,
RdTW 125, at 130 et seq. (2013); Oehmke, above n. 25, at 447 et seq.
67. § 31(2), sentence 3, no. 2 GewO; see Oehmke, above n. 25, at 455.
68. § 31(1) GewO.
69. § 31(2) GewO.
70. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 763; see also VGH Kassel,
Order of 21 July 2015 – 8 B 1916/14 – ECLI:DE:VGHHE:2015:0721.
8B1916.14.0A, para. 2.
71. § 31(2), sentence 4, GewO; see also Oehmke, above n. 25, at 443.
72. § 31(2), sentence 3, no. 1, GewO.
73. Regarding the latter as a ground for refusal see § 31(2), sentence 3, no.
3, GewO.
more detailed and intricate, are laid down in secondary
legislation, namely, the Ordinance on the Licensing of
Security Companies on Ocean-Going Sea Vessels (in
the following: Licensing Ordinance74) and the Imple-
menting Ordinance for the Ocean-Going Vessel Securi-
ty Ordinance (in the following: Implementing Ordi-
nance75).
Whereas § 31 GewO safeguards that every security com-
pany operating from Germany or on German-flagged
vessels will need to be licensed pursuant to the new
regime, an amendment to the German Ordinance on
Shipboard Security Measures (See- Eigensicherungs-
verordnung76) establishes a duty of ship owners sailing
under the German flag and wishing to deploy armed
guards to only employ those with a license pursuant to
§ 31 GewO.77 In order to safeguard that a sufficient
number of such companies is available, the duty pur-
suant to the German Ordinance on Shipboard Security
Measures entered into force about nine months after the
licensing regime.78 The ordinance obliges ship owners
and operators to apply for an annex to the ship security
plan mandatory pursuant to the International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This annex needs to
detail that armed security guards will be used, that those
guards are licensed pursuant to § 31 GewO and that
they will keep to the ‘Revised Interim Guidance to
Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the
Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’79 published by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO).80 By
doing so, the ordinance factually makes adherence to
this soft law instrument mandatory.
Employing guards without a license pursuant to
§ 31(1,2) GewO constitutes an administrative offence by
the ship owner, which may result in a fine of up to
15,000 euros being imposed.81 This procedure is admin-
istered by the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic
Agency (Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und Hydrogra-
phie [BSH]). Such a violation will lead to the revocation
of the approval of the annex to the ship security plan.82
74. Ordinance of 11 June 2013 (BGBl. I 1562).
75. Ordinance of 21 June 2013 (BGBl. I 1623).
76. Ordinance of 19 September 2005 (BGBl. I 2787), last amended by Art.
3 of the Ordinance of 1 March 2016 (BGBl. I 329).
77. See § 7(2a), sentence 1, no. 2(b), and sentence 3, German Ordinance
on Shipboard Security Measures.
78. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 761.
79. MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev. 2, 25 May 2012, as published by the Federal
Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development, as it then was,
in Verkehrsblatt 2013, at 640.
80. § 7(2a), sentence 1, no. 2(a) and (b), German Ordinance on Shipboard
Security Measures.
81. Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift für die Erteilung von Buß – und Ver-
warnungsgeldern für Zuwiderhandlungen gegen strom – und schiff-
fahrtspolizeiliche Vorschriften des Bundes auf Binnen – und Seeschiff-
fahrtsstraßen sowie in der ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone und auf
der Hohen See (Buß – und Verwarnungsgeldkatalog Binnen – und See-
schifffahrtsstraßen – BVKatBin-See), 2015, para. 37.103200 (at 333).
82. § 7(4) German Ordinance on Shipboard Security Measures.
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4.1.2 Ordinance on the Licensing of Security Companies
on Ocean-Going Sea Vessels
The basic norm, § 4(1) Licensing Ordinance, regulates
that in order to apply for a license, a company has to set
up and document a proper operational framework that
ensures compliance with legal requirements and main-
tain this framework during the term of the license. The
company furthermore has to define, document and reg-
ularly update appropriate procedures for planning and
conducting operations at sea, such as the composition
and qualification of the security personnel, procedural
rules on the use of force and weapons and the monitor-
ing of the security operatives on board.83 In addition,
the company has to regulate the duties of its security
operatives through a general standing order, operations-
specific standing orders and shift scheduling84 and
ensure that the security operatives are equipped with
appropriate, serviceable equipment for carrying out
their security function.85 Concerning the employees
actually exercising security functions, the company has
to ensure that guards are reliable,86 are at least 18 years
old,87 have the necessary personal aptitude88 and possess
the necessary competence.89 The company also has to
name a so-called designated executive, who acts as a link
between the company and the German authorities.90
Regarding this executive, the company has to submit
records showing that he or she, as the person who is
responsible to ensure compliance with the regulation,91
also fulfils these requirements.92 The company wishing
to be licensed also has to produce proof of having a lia-
bility insurance policy that fulfils the requirements pur-
suant to § 12 of the Licensing Ordinance and submit a
company profile containing a description of the market
position of the security company in the field of maritime
security.93
4.1.3 Implementing Ordinance for the Ocean-Going
Vessel Security Ordinance
The Implementing Ordinance first regulates the
appointment procedure of the designated executive94
and the organisational structure of the company in ques-
tion.95 In doing so, it establishes relatively detailed
83. § 5(1) Licensing Ordinance.
84. § 5(2) Licensing Ordinance.
85. § 6(1), sentence 1, Licensing Ordinance.
86. § 8 Licensing Ordinance.
87. § 7, no. 2, Licensing Ordinance.
88. § 9 Licensing Ordinance.
89. § 10 Licensing Ordinance.
90. The BAFA on its webpage mentions the designated executive as a ‘role
model for the security personnel’, who must ‘possess the same level of
knowledge’; see the FAQ section on the BAFA webpage, ‘Does the
executive has to possess the full level of knowledge pursuant to section
10 Ordinance on the Licensing of Security Companies on Ocean-Going
Sea Vessels already at the time when the application is filed or is it pos-
sible to submit the evidence later, probably after licensing?’, available
at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/Maritime_Security/maritime
_security_node.html.
91. § 4(1), sentence 2, no. 1, Licensing Ordinance.
92. § 11(2-4) Licensing Ordinance.
93. § 2(2) Licensing Ordinance.
94. § 1 Implementing Ordinance.
95. § 2 Implementing Ordinance.
standards. First, the company has to establish areas of
responsibility of the specific guards on board a vessel
and of other employees.96 It also has to explain how the
company will deal with cases of absence.97 The Imple-
menting Ordinance also mandates that the security team
of a vessel has to be sufficiently staffed, requiring a min-
imum of four operatives, but opening the possibility to
require more team members whenever the risk assess-
ment shows a necessity for a higher headcount.98 The
company also has to show that it has documented crite-
ria to determine staffing requirements, including role
distribution within the security team. It lays out that
each vessel protection team must consist of a) a team
leader, b) a deputy team leader, c) guards and d) a
trained paramedic; however, b), c), and d) may be per-
formed by the same person, as long as the team does not
fall short of the minimum number of team members.99
While the Licensing Ordinance regulates the material
requirements, which the members of a security team
have to fulfil, the Implementing Ordinance sets stand-
ards for the personnel selection and review process,
which the company has to follow to ensure that the
material requirements are continuously fulfilled.100 It
also lays down some rules for the training of a compa-
ny’s employees,101 for example, a minimum of four
weapons training sessions a year, which may not be
more than six months apart.102 How these trainings are
conducted is again up to the company.103 Furthermore,
companies have to introduce internal control,104 docu-
mentation105 and communication processes, for exam-
ple, to safeguard the immediate report of imminent or
observed misconduct to the designated executive.106
The Implementing Ordinance also regulates the duty of
the company to have deployment procedures in place,
which include a consideration of the IMO’s ‘Revised
Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed
Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk
Area’, and observance of the ‘Best Management Practi-
ces for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy’
(BMP).107 The deployment procedures also have to
safeguard the strict avoidance of physical force and the
use of weapons. Exceptions may only be made when
96. The necessity to make available a sufficient number of employees
around the clock on land to maintain operations is regulated in § 1(1),
no. 3, of the Implementing Ordinance. For the requirement to legal
advice around the clock see § 8 of Implementing Ordinance.
97. § 2(1), no. 1, Implementing Ordinance.
98. § 2(1), no. 2, Implementing Ordinance.
99. § 2(1), no. 2, Implementing Ordinance.
100. § 4 and 5 Implementing Ordinance.
101. § 6 and 7 Implementing Ordinance.
102. § 7(2) Implementing Ordinance.
103. See the answer to the question, ‘How and to what extent should the
legal knowledge training be organized?’, in the FAQ section on the
BAFA webpage, available at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/
Maritime_Security/maritime_security_node.html.
104. § 9 Implementing Ordinance.
105. § 10 Implementing Ordinance.
106. § 11 Implementing Ordinance as a whole, but especially § 11(1), no. 2,
Implementing Ordinance.
107. § 12(2) Implementing Ordinance.
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they are in accordance with the German legislation, par-
ticularly the rules on self-defence with special consider-
ation given to appropriateness, necessity and propor-
tionality of the defensive action.108 The Ordinance
specifies:
If an attack is in progress and other milder defensive
measures are unsuccessful or if their use is unpromis-
ing, the team leader gives the instruction – after the
captain has expressly ordered it – to occupy the
defensive positions and make preparations to fire.
With consideration given to the general circum-
stances in individual cases, the following basic escala-
tion levels are provided for:
1. warning shots into the air,
2. warning shots into the water in the vicinity of the
attackers,
3. targeted shots at objects, particularly at the boat
motor or hull,
4. as a last resort, if all milder defensive measures are
ineffective, it is possible to use firearms directly
against the attackers.109
It is noteworthy that master of a vessel (here: the cap-
tain) remains the final decision-maker. This was uncon-
troversial during the legislative process, since it is man-
dated by international and German law and its impor-
tance was universally supported.110 While the Imple-
menting Ordinance thus gives directions on how to
exercise the right to self-defence, the legal rules regulat-
ing the use of force, however, remain unchanged com-
pared to the law before 2013. The new § 31(2), sentence
4, GewO refers to § 34a(5) GewO and thus clarifies that
security guards working for BAFA-licensed companies
are – just as bouncers in nightclubs – regularly limited
to the right to self-defence.111 This has proven to be suf-
ficient in practice, as the criminal law notion of self-
defence is quite permissive in German law.112 However,
it has drawn criticism because such cases of professional
or institutionalised self-defence are quite different from
the cases the law originally meant to regulate by grant-
ing a right to self-defence.113 In addition, it has been a
108. § 12(4), sentence 2, Implementing Ordinance.
109. § 12(4), sentences 4 and 5, Implementing Ordinance.
110. See e.g. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 766; R.E. Heller and
H. Soschinka, ‘Seepiraterie-Bekämpfung durch private Bewachungsun-
ternehmen’, NVwZ 476, at 479 (2013); Oehmke, above n. 25, at 201
et seq. with further references.
111. § 34a(5) GewO refers to more legal bases and in fact more legal bases
apply, e.g. the ‘Hausrecht’, allowing an owner of premises to exclude
some people from using it and to expel them, as well as the ‘rights’ pur-
suant to § 34 German Penal Code and §§ 227-9, 904 German Civil
Code. However, in maritime security cases, the right to self-defence and
defence of others pursuant to § 32 German Penal Code regularly is the
only decisive legal basis for armed defence.
112. See for a maritime security-based study on this König and Salomon
(2011), above n. 21, at 327 et seq.; Oehmke, above n. 25, at 484 et
seq.
113. For a discussion, see Oehmke, above n. 25, at 394 et seq.; S. Kommer,
‘Private Gefahrenabwehr auf Hoher See’, DÖV 236, at 245 (2016); for
a general discussion of the ratio legis of the right to self-defence in Ger-
man law, see U. Kindhäuser, in U. Kindhäuser, U. Neumann &
H.U. Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch (2017) § 32, para. 7 et seq.
topic of minor debate in German law whether there is a
potential right of private guards to arrest (suspected)
pirates.114
The Implementing Ordinance also goes into the nitty-
gritty details, regulating the minimum equipment a
security team has to bring on board a vessel, including
night vision device, range finder, binoculars, long fire-
arms, short firearms (especially for confrontations with
an attacker after the ship was boarded115), sufficient
ammunition, ballistic helmets, camera, ballistic vests,
radio equipment with microphone headset, satellite tele-
phone, medical equipment as well as automatic life
vests.116 Fines have been imposed for the failure to com-
ply with these requirements. A case in point was a vessel
protection team that was not equipped with short fire-
arms.117
Violations of the obligations outlined in the foregoing
regularly are administrative offences penalised with a
fine, which is administered by the BAFA.118 However,
as the main and most punitive sanction available to the
BAFA a license may be revoked pursuant to the general
rules of German administrative law when the terms of
the license have been violated by the license-holder.119
4.2 Licensing Procedure
The licensing procedure has been designed to meet the
requirements of the international maritime industry.
The licensing procedure can be undergone electronical-
ly, and the German authorities provide the necessary
information and documents in English and largely
accept the necessary documentation in English.120 In
contrast to the old normative framework, there is no
need for company employees or the company manage-
ment to appear before the authorities in person. In order
to accelerate the process, the BAFA has published a
self-assessment checklist to allow companies a quick
self-check, to determine whether they fulfil all require-
ments.121 The costs associated with applying for such a
license are significant. An early estimation approxima-
ted the costs of a German company entering the market
in the first year at around 1.1 million euros as initial cost
114. See e.g. Kommer, above n. 113, at 244, who regrettably misreads the
study of König and Salomon (2011), above n. 21, as being of the opin-
ion that armed guards have a right to arrest pirates pursuant to German
law. The study merely argued – in the segment focussing on interna-
tional law – that such an act would not in and of itself be an act of pira-
cy pursuant to the UNCLOS definition, which mirrors the opinion of the
ILC, see ILC, UN Doc. A/3159 (1956), at 283.
115. Erfahrungsbericht des Bundesamtes für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle
im Einvernehmen mit dem Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und Hydrogra-
phie und der Bundespolizei, BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, at 24.
116. § 14(2) Implementing Ordinance.
117. See BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 115, at 24.
118. § 144(5) GewO; examples of such misconduct are the intentional or
negligent violation of the duty to obtain a license, which may result in
fines up to 50,000 euros (§ 144(1) no. 2 and (4), GewO) and violations
of the Licensing Ordinance, which may be penalized with fines up to
5,000 euros (§ 144(2) no. 1, GewO and § 16 Licensing Ordinance).
119. § 49 VwVfG.
120. BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 115, at 9.
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and subsequently around 100,000 euros as annual cost.
For companies in the market, but not working with an
internal process manual, the costs for an application are
estimated at 103,500 euros, while a company in the mar-
ket already working with such a process manual will
likely face significantly lower expenses. The annual
training costs are estimated to be around 10,000
euros.122
If a company applies for a license, it does so by filling
out the electronic application form on the BAFA web-
page and attaching the necessary documents.123 Due to
the large volume of documents received in an applica-
tion, the licensing process takes time. All in all, the pro-
cedure regularly takes ‘some months’ according to the
BAFA.124 While the process has in the past been slowed
down by the failure of companies to submit necessary
documents, another factor for a time delay is the fact
that the subject matter is deemed as being vulnerable to
corruption. Because of this, each application undergoes
a primary examination and then a secondary audit by
another government employee.125 The necessary evalua-
tion of the company’s insurance to ascertain whether it
fulfils the requirements of § 12 Licensing Ordinance was
identified as being another source for time delay. To
alleviate this factor, the insurer can submit a confirma-
tion letter to the BAFA.126
In the authorisation process, the BAFA consults closely
with the specialised maritime branch of the Federal
Police based on an administrative arrangement which
specifies that the Federal Police issue a recommendation
in the licensing process and the BAFA considers it
before deciding on granting the license.127 A stronger
role of the Federal Police, for example, as the authority
competent to grant the licenses or at least as an authori-
ty with a veto power was rejected during the legislative
process.128
The period of validity of a BAFA license is two years.129
A previous draft of the new legislation proposed one
year as a possible duration to guarantee a higher degree
of control and regularity of inspection, but the longer
period was deemed necessary to balance practical
demands and meaningful oversight.130 Recent demands
from the maritime industry to extend the duration to
three years were unsuccessful. This was mainly because
BAFA acknowledges the need to keep the duration at
two years, in order to ensure a regular and meaningful
control over the companies, which is easier realised dur-
122. All estimates taken from the draft legislation, Entwurf eines Gesetzes
zur Einführung eines Zulassungsverfahrens für Bewachungsunterneh-
men auf Seeschiffen, BT-Drs. 17/10960 of 10 October 2012, at 3.
123. The application page is accessible at https://fms.bafa.de/BafaFrame/
bewachung.
124. BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 115, at 10.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 115, at 12.
128. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 763; Oehmke, above n. 25, at
446.
129. § 3 Licensing Ordinance.
130. See Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 766; König and Salomon
(2014), above n. 26, at 243.
ing the licensing process than by the state oversight
mechanisms in place.131
4.3 Weapons Act
The Weapons Act has been amended in order to go
along with the corporate approach of the new § 31
GewO.132 Pursuant to the new regulatory framework,
armed security companies operating on German-flagged
vessels still need a weapon owner’s license to possess the
weapons needed to carry out their duties.133 While the
BAFA is competent to license security companies pur-
suant to § 31 GewO, the authorities of the Free and
Hanseatic City of Hamburg are competent to issue the
permit to the applying company that is necessary under
the Weapons Act.134 The authorities may exchange
information with the BAFA, resulting in a much better
information basis of the Hamburg authorities, since the
BAFA regularly will have a much more detailed picture
of the companies applying for a license.135
Pursuant to § 28a WaffG, the company has to apply for
a permit, which, if granted, allows security operators
and their personnel to acquire, possess and carry guns
and ammunition on ocean-going vessels flying the Ger-
man flag.136 In practice, the company manager has to
produce an identity card or passport and a police clear-
ance certificate (if he or she is a foreign national137).
With the application, the company also has to make
available copies of identification documents, employ-
ment contracts and police clearance certificates (in case
of foreign nationals) of the security guards, as well as
their certificates of weapons expertise and documents
showing that they have knowledge of German arms leg-
islation and related laws and regulations. Furthermore,
the executive staff also have to provide proof of weapons
expertise and knowledge of German arms legislation and
related laws and regulations. Last, the company has to
produce evidence that weapons are kept safely at the
company and a safekeeping policy for the storage of
weapons on board trade vessels is in place.138
The reformed regulatory framework is parallel to the
§ 31 GewO. While in the past the permit could only be
obtained by people having to appear before the compe-
tent authorities, providing evidence that they fulfil the
legal requirements, the permit now is addressed to the
company, encompasses the staff, and it is the company’s
131. See BT-Drs. 18/6443 of 16 October 2015, above n. 64, at 7-9; for a
discussion of state oversight mechanisms under the regime, see Section
4.5 in this article.
132. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht, BT-Drs. 17/11887 of 12 December
2012, at 21.
133. § 10(1) WaffG; see also Oehmke, above n. 25, at 457.
134. § 48(1), sentence 2, WaffG. In case of German security companies, the
authorities of Hamburg consult with the local authorities at the seat of
the company, § 28a(5) WaffG.
135. § 28a(3), sentences 3 and 4, WaffG.
136. § 28a(1), sentence 1, WaffG.
137. If a German national applies for a permit, the local authorities have the
right to obtain such a certificate from the competent German authori-
ties.
138. For these practical aspects of the authorisation process, see the BAFA
webpage under ‘Application Procedure’ – ‘License under the Weapons
Act’, available at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/Maritime_
Security/maritime_security_node.html.
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duty to safeguard that the legal requirements are met.139
Pursuant to § 28a(1) WaffG, the weapons permit ‘shall
be issued subject to conditions requiring the operator’ to
employ as security personnel only persons who meet the
requirements given in § 4(1) nos. 1 through 3 (meaning
the persons in question are older than eighteen, are reli-
able and have the personal aptitude for the task and have
the necessary expertise with weapons). A further condi-
tion of the permit is that the company will inform the
responsible authority within a period of time to be
determined by that authority as to which persons have
been assigned as armed guards.140 Last, the company is
obliged ‘at the request of the responsible authority, to
present evidence demonstrating that the persons
assigned these tasks meet the requirements’ mentioned
above.141 Concerning the only additional requirement,
the necessity to use guns for the protection offered, this
necessity is assumed by law for companies licensed pur-
suant to § 31 GewO.142
Not only the procedure but also the content of the tradi-
tional requirements for obtaining a weapons permit,
reliability, aptitude, competence and necessity are modi-
fied to fit different settings. For example, the specialised
knowledge necessary pursuant to § 7(2) WaffG ‘shall be
oriented on the special requirements for deployment on
ships at sea’ as far as permits under § 28a WaffG are
concerned.143
The weapons permit has the same duration as the
license pursuant to § 31 GewO144 and includes the per-
mit to bring the weapons on board a vessel pursuant to
§ 29 WaffG.145
The type of weapons that are permissible has remained
unchanged under the new legislation.146 Consequently,
the use of war weapons in accordance with the Annex 2
to the War Weapons Control Act, especially automatic
weapons, remains illegal.147 This aspect was largely
uncontroversial during the legislative proceeding in
Germany and seems to be in contrast to the approach in
other nations.148
4.4 Recognition of Other Licenses
To safeguard accordance with European Law, govern-
ment licenses and other state-recognised certifications,
which allow security functions on ocean-going vessels
and are issued by another member state of the European
139. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 764.
140. § 28a, sentence 3, no. 2, WaffG.
141. § 28a, sentence 3, no. 3, WaffG.
142. § 28a(1), sentence 2, WaffG; see also Oehmke, above n. 25, at 459.
143. § 28a(3), sentence 2, WaffG.
144. § 28a(1), sentence 1, WaffG.
145. See Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 764; with further details in
Oehmke, above n. 25, at 461.
146. See § 57 WaffG.
147. Oehmke, above n. 25, at 457-8 with further reference and a discussion
on the possibility of the German Federal Criminal Police Office to issue
exemptions pursuant to § 40(4) WaffG.
148. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 765; the legislation in Belgium
seems to allow automatic weapons; see Jessen, above n. 66, at 132;
however, it only does so on a case-by-case basis; see L. McMahon,
‘Belgian Law Permitting Devastating Ammunition Reignites Row Over
Appropriate Use of Force’, Lloyd’s List, 27 February 2013.
Union or a contracting state to the Agreement on the
European Economic Area, shall be accorded equal treat-
ment with licenses issued pursuant to § 31(1) GewO.149
Other state’s licenses may be accorded equal treatment
pursuant to § 15(2) Licensing Ordinance. The prerequi-
site for the recognition of any such license is, however,
that the ‘requirements for such foreign licenses or cer-
tifications are materially equivalent to the requirements’
under the Licensing Ordinance.150 A company carrying
such other license needs to apply for equal treatment. If
this request is granted – by way of an ‘official notifica-
tion’151 from the BAFA – this permission has a term of
two years.152 § 15 of the Licensing Ordinance deems the
notification, reporting and submission obligations of a
company applicable in such a case,153 which may mean
that a company will have reporting obligations vis-à-vis
two states.
4.5 State Oversight and Control
A critical aspect of any regulation is state oversight and
enforcement. This is especially true for rules concerning
maritime affairs, since the subject of legal obligations is
regularly far from the national authorities’ reach.154 To
achieve meaningful control and oversight, the new regu-
lation first limits the license’s duration to two years and
thus mandates a regularly repeating licensing proce-
dure.155 Furthermore, it addresses the issue within the
parameters of its corporate approach in that it acknowl-
edges that there is a need for the authorities to obtain
knowledge of any incidents in order to assess whether
there was wrongdoing and, if necessary, sanction of mis-
conduct.
To reach this goal, the regulatory framework introduces
numerous reporting obligations:
4.5.1 Reporting Obligations of the Security Company
The security company is obliged to report every deploy-
ment of armed guards to the BAFA.156 Furthermore, it
needs to report on every incident which led to shots
being fired,157 any case of loss of weapons and/or
ammunition158 and changes in the internal organisation
of the company.159 § 14 of the Licensing Ordinance also
regulates, however, that the person liable to provide
information may refuse to answer questions, if this
would subject the particular person or relatives to crimi-
149. § 15(1) Licensing Ordinance.
150. § 15 Licensing Ordinance. § 15(1) applies to EU and EEA member
states, while § 15(2) applies to all other states.
151. § 15(3), sentence 1, Licensing Ordinance.
152. § 15(3), sentence 2, Licensing Ordinance.
153. § 15(4), Licensing Ordinance.
154. The government acknowledged this in the draft legislation, BT-Drs.
17/10960 of 10 October 2012, above n. 118, at 12.
155. BT-Drs. 17/10960 of 10 October 2012, above n. 118, at 12.
156. § 14(1) Licensing Ordinance.
157. § 14(2) Licensing Ordinance; the norm includes an additional obligation
to report this to the Federal Police.
158. § 14(4) Licensing Ordinance.
159. § 14(3) Licensing Ordinance.
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nal proceedings or proceedings under the Administra-
tive Offenses Act.160
Noncompliance with these duties is an administrative
offence, which may result in a fine of up to 5,000
euros.161
4.5.2 Reporting Obligations of the Ship Owner or Ship
Operator
The master of the vessel in question is also obliged to
report incidents. Insofar, the obligations are adminis-
tered by the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agen-
cy. As stated previously, ship owners using armed
security guards are obliged to apply for an annex to the
mandatory ship security plan. This annex is approved
subject to the condition that the ship owner adheres to
and will ensure that others adhere to the reporting and
record-keeping obligations.162 Concerning their reach
and structure, these duties lean on the IMO’s ‘Revised
Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed
Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk
Area’, which suggests that the ‘master should maintain a
log of every circumstance in which firearms are dis-
charged, whether accidental or deliberate’ to fully docu-
ment such events in sufficient detail.163 The report
should include time and location of the incident, details
of events leading up to the incident, written statements
by all witnesses and those involved from the ship’s crew
and security team in the incident, the identity and
details of personnel involved in the incident, details of
the incident, injuries and/or material damage sustained
during the incident, and identify lessons learned from
the incident and, where applicable, recommended pro-
cedures to prevent a recurrence of the incident.164
Thus, in the process of obtaining approval for the ship
security plan, the ship owner or operator has to declare
that the reporting modalities pursuant to the IMO
Guidelines will be adhered to, that is, that they will
oblige the master to report to them any such incidents.
According to the German Ordinance on Shipboard
Security Measures, the company security officer of the
ship owner or operator will then have reporting obliga-
tions towards the state authorities. First, the company
has to report the use of private armed guards 24 hours
before entry into a risk area.165 The company further-
more has to keep the records of reports from the masters
for a period of two years starting at the end of the calen-
160. § 14(3a) Licensing Ordinance; see Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 22,
at 766.
161. § 144(2), no. 1, GewO and § 16 Licensing Ordinance.
162. § 7(2a), sentence 2, German Ordinance on Shipboard Security Meas-
ures (See- Eigensicherungsverordnung).
163. IMO, ‘Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Person-
nel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’, para. 5.16.
164. IMO, ‘Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Person-
nel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’, para. 5.17.
165. § 7(2a), sentence 2, no. 1, German Ordinance on Shipboard Security
Measures.
dar year.166 It also has to hand them over to the BAFA,
the BSH and the Federal Police in case of an incident
where shots were fired or otherwise hand them over
after being asked to do so by these authorities.167 Non-
compliance with those obligations again is an adminis-
trative offence punishable with fines up to 5,000
euros.168
4.5.3 Assessment
Those parallel reporting obligations are meant to offer
two different perspectives of an incident and enable the
authorities to ascertain the veracity and comprehensive-
ness of reports.169 The authorities themselves character-
ise these instruments as having an outstanding impor-
tance to improve the otherwise lacking mechanisms of
control and state oversight.170
This assessment is likely exaggerated. State oversight
remains a very problematic topic. While the German
regulation does attempt to safeguard that the German
authorities will be made aware of incidents, it is all too
easy to imagine circumstances in which the interests of
the security team, the master of the vessel and the ship-
ping company converge in the sense that they have a
shared interest to keep German authorities ignorant. A
case in point is the Enrica Lexie. This case featured Ital-
ian soldiers trying to defend the vessel they were sta-
tioned on with armed force, resulting in the death of
two fishermen under unclear circumstances. While the
case now centres on questions of state immunity,171 with
the Indian authorities trying to prosecute the Italian sol-
diers, the case does offer a good example for private
armed guards as well. Fishermen often follow large ves-
sels, because they attract fish to the water surface. Pri-
vate guards’ wrongly assessing such a situation may
treat them as a threat. If armed force were used in such
a case, the reporting obligations of the German regula-
tory framework would be put to a hard test.
Depending on his or her involvement in an incident, the
master of the vessel, being the person ultimately in
charge, may have a significant interest not to report the
case. After all, any step of publicising it could lead to
local authorities of coastal or port states obtaining
knowledge as well, putting the master at risk of criminal
prosecution. The same applies for the armed guards.
166. § 7(2a), sentence 2, no. 2, German Ordinance on Shipboard Security
Measures.
167. § 7(2a), sentence 2, no. 3, German Ordinance on Shipboard Security
Measures.
168. § 12(1), no. 6, German Ordinance on Shipboard Security Measures;
Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift für die Erteilung von Buß – und Ver-
warnungsgeldern für Zuwiderhandlungen gegen strom – und schiff-
fahrtspolizeiliche Vorschriften des Bundes auf Binnen – und Seeschiff-
fahrtsstraßen sowie in der ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone und auf
der Hohen See (Buß – und Verwarnungsgeldkatalog Binnen
– und Seeschifffahrtsstraßen – BVKatBin-See), 2015, paras.
37.104100-37.104320 (at 334); Oehmke (above n. 25, at 469) sees a
maximum fine of up to 50,000 euros on the basis of § 15(1), no. 2
Seeaufgabengesetz (Federal Maritime Responsibilities Act), she, how-
ever, neglects the above-mentioned administrative regulation limiting
administrative fines in these cases.
169. BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 111, at 12.
170. BT-Drs. 18/5456 of 1 July 2015, above n. 115, at 12.
171. See e.g. Jessen, above n. 66, at 128 et seq.
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They may even rely on their right not to report pur-
suant to § 14(3a) Licensing Ordinance and the nemo ten-
etur maxim, that is, the right against self-incrimination.
It has also been alluded to the fact that colleagues, that
is, other team members of a vessel protection team, who
may or may not have been involved in misconduct, may
have a tendency to be loyal to their colleagues and as
such may not alert the authorities or the company.172
The same calculation would apply if the reports actually
reach a shipping or security company, especially since a
shipping company will regularly want to avoid lengthy
police operations on their vessel which may expose them
to significant damage claims of their customers,173 and a
security company will certainly not want to risk publi-
cising an incident. Furthermore, a violation of a report-
ing obligation is punishable only by a fine of up to 5,000
euros, which will regularly mean violating the reporting
obligation and taking the risk of having to pay a fine will
be more attractive than risking that an incident is publi-
cised.174 Of course, a security company risks their
license with an intentional violation of a reporting obli-
gation; however, the withdrawal of the license presup-
poses that the state authorities obtain knowledge of an
incident, which will rarely be the case.175 As such, it is
conceivable that the German authorities would never
receive the information of an Enrica Lexie-like scenario,
at least, if the crew and the security team remain physi-
cally unscathed. Most likely, they would simply receive
a report of ammunition having been lost.
While it is acknowledged that such a scenario is never
completely avoidable in a maritime setting, it has been
submitted during the legislative process that more can
be done to enable state authorities to investigate critical
incidents. This remains the case. Mandating the armed
guards to wear body or helmet cameras was one sugges-
tion.176 While armed guards after a critical incident
could report their cameras as lost, a report of lost
ammunition and lost body cameras would raise louder
alarms and would be a reason to possibly initiate crimi-
nal investigations. Another suggestion was to enable the
crew of a vessel to anonymously report such incidents to
the flag state authorities.177 Such reporting mechanisms
would not need to be invented but could follow the
anonymous reporting mechanism already put into place
by the Maritime Labour Convention and would simply
need to transfer the ‘protection of whistle-blowers’ idea
of the ISO/PAS 28007:2012 standards in no. 5.9 f to the
172. Oehmke, above n. 25, at 468-9.
173. Oehmke, above n. 25, at 470.
174. See Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 767; Oehmke, above n.
25, at 469.
175. See Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 767; Oehmke, above n.
25, at 469.
176. T.R. Salomon and S. tho Pesch, ‘Zertifizierung bewaffneter Sicherheit-
skräfte auf deutschen Handelsschiffen und Staatshaftung’, NordÖR 65,
at 70 (2012); Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 767.
177. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 176, at 70; T.R. Salomon and S. tho
Pesch, ‘License to kill? – Staatshaftung und die Zertifizierung von mariti-
men Sicherheitsdienstleistern’, ZRP 1, at 4 (2012).
crew of a vessel.178 These suggestions would not make
state oversight perfect, but they would surely raise the
probability that an incident is reported to the state
authorities. However, they were not implemented to
this date. Thus, until today, the only possibility to
obtain knowledge of an incident and thus be able to
investigate is to hope that the companies involved and
the private guards as well as the masters of the vessels
will adhere to their reporting obligations.
Apart from reporting and record-keeping obligations,
BAFA continues to have the rights pursuant to § 29
GewO, namely, to mandate the company to disclose
information on certain aspects. Theoretically, the BAFA
also has the right to enter the premises of businesses
during business hours to inspect the business records.179
The right to enter the premises is limited, at least vis-à-
vis foreign companies, since the BAFA cannot exercise
its rights under national law in another sovereign coun-
try without its permission. The right to request
information, however, is still a viable option. Denying
such a right without a sufficient legal reason is – again –
only seen as an administrative offence, this time pur-
suant to § 146(2) no. 4 GewO and thus punishable with
a fine of up to 2,500 euros. However, if a security com-
pany denies a request for information, the BAFA would
likely have sufficient grounds to revoke the license of a
company.180
5 Concluding Remarks
Overall, the new regulation deserves praise in that it
intends to raise the quality standards of such a global,
dynamic and risk-prone industry. The positive aspects
include the close connection to the internationally
accepted standards of the IMO, ISO as well as the
BMP, which limit the likelihood that the German stand-
ards contribute to a fragmented landscape of different
national standards. The detailed regulatory framework
in the ordinances ensures the clarity of standards. The
minimum personnel requirement of four security
guards significantly contributes to higher standards, as
the tendency to cut costs by reducing the number of
guards – especially vital today, since the number of
attacks have dropped – is counteracted. However, state
oversight and government control remain a significant
problem since high material standards only have value
when compliance is safeguarded.
178. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 767; in the same direction,
Oehmke, above n. 25, at 471.
179. § 29 GewO.
180. See e.g. Meßerschmidt, in Pielow (ed.), Beck-OK GewO, § 29, para. 27,
with reference to a judgment of the Federal Administrative Court,
28 July 1978, 1 C 43/75, which did not feature a case of a denial of an
information request, but a restaurant owner denying cooperation with
the police to combat the trade of controlled substances in his business.
He was held to be unreliable pursuant to the GewO, because of his
denial to cooperate. A case of a denied information request may also
call into question the reliability of the management personnel of a mari-
time security company.
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It is hard to say how the German license scheme would
have fared, had the pirate attacks remained at the high
rate of 2010-2011. Today, German ship owners still to a
large extent sail the high-risk areas under foreign flags.
Although this has been the case all along, it still is note-
worthy that the regulatory overhaul did not result in a
reorientation of the ship owners towards the German
flag. The number of security companies that are current
BAFA license holders is at eight,181 four of which are
German companies of which most are not exactly
household names in the field of maritime security pro-
viders. In January 2014, seven companies were listed as
carrying licenses.182 Currently, many of the German
companies that saw a chance of getting into the market
in 2011-2012 seem to have given up on offering vessel
protection services, since bigger foreign companies
seemingly had too much of a head start in the sector to
allow smaller German companies to secure a large-
enough market share.
There were a number of reasons why maritime security
companies did not apply for a BAFA license more fre-
quently – and they are not necessarily found in the
reformed GewO and the WaffG. Practitioners reported
early on that while obtaining a license was a complex
procedure, obtaining an export license was much more
cumbersome and time-consuming. It was not the prime
focus of the ministries involved in conceptualising the
new regulatory framework that transporting weapons
out of Germany for use on ocean-going vessels in inter-
national waters is a (temporary) export in the legal
sense. Thus, it is subject to additional licensing pur-
suant to § 8 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Regula-
tion and, if applicable, under Article 4(1) of Regulation
(EU) Number 258/2012.183 Long waiting periods for
security companies were the consequence of this and
while foreign companies could build their businesses
and operate on non-German-flagged vessels, German
security companies were prohibited from working in the
field, which resulted in an even greater head start of for-
eign companies. The BAFA now offers a collective
license procedure for repeated temporary exports for
companies licensed pursuant to § 31 GewO, which alle-
viates some of the delay but results in yet other demands
on the internal organisation of the company.184 These
birth defects of the reformed regulatory framework not
181. The companies are published at http://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_
Trade/Maritime_Security/maritime_security_node.html (last visited
11 May 2018).
182. König and Salomon (2014), above n. 26, at 243.
183. See the BAFA webpage under ‘Application Procedure’ – ‘License under
Export Control Law’, available at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/
Foreign_Trade/Maritime_Security/maritime_security_node.html; for an
extensive analysis of the export control regime, see Oehmke, above n.
25, at 473 et seq.
184. According to the BAFA, the collective license procedure ‘permit exports
and transfers of goods subject to licensing to different countries and dif-
ferent consignees. The application for such a collective licence proce-
dure licence requires in particular a well-functioning internal export con-
trol system (ICP).… In fact, private security services have to install their
own ICP in order to manage and comply with the collective licence pro-
cedure licences granted.’ Available at: http://www.bafa.de/EN/
Foreign_Trade/Maritime_Security/maritime_security_node.html.
only hindered German companies but also likely affec-
ted how the BAFA license regime was seen in the indus-
try.
Although the presence of only a few companies on the
BAFA-list of licensed companies speaks for a very insig-
nificant impact of the German regulations on the indus-
try at large, the regulation seems to have had an impact,
nevertheless. In a market where the projection of relia-
bility may mean a significant edge over competitors, it
was predicted early on that even though the BAFA
license may not be used much in practice, big companies
may opt to obtain it as a seal of approval to signal high-
quality standards.185 This came to pass as evidenced by
early reactions of security companies hailing the new
regulation as an important step to quality assurance in
the market.186 Up until today, large international mari-
time security providers are licensed by the BAFA,
meaning they changed their internal business organisa-
tion to comply with the German regulation, a factor that
may also determine their conduct, if they protect vessels
under foreign flags.
Contributions focussing on maritime security providers
always end on a similar note. There are many reasons
why one may justifiably be uncomfortable with the
practice of maritime armed guards acting far away from
state oversight in a line of business that will regularly
mean that the lives of (presumed) attackers are taken or
grievous bodily harm is caused. However, they have
proven to be an effective component of the necessary
defence of trade vessels against pirate attacks. Because
of that, this business model will likely be here to stay.
Accordingly, regulating this industry to meet the justi-
fied criticism, to counteract possible misconduct and to
put state authorities in the know must remain a top pri-
ority. However, a more global approach to the topic
would be necessary to hinder the possibility of the ship
owners to opt out of national legislation by changing
their vessels’ flags. This is hardly going to come easy
since popular flag states will likely be reluctant to intro-
duce restrictive legislation.
185. Salomon and tho Pesch, above n. 25, at 769.
186. ‘USA: AdvanFort Praises New Accreditation Criteria for Private Maritime
Security Companies’, World Maritime News, 9 September 2013, avail-
able at: http://bit.ly/2CezQSP.
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